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REVIEW BY CERTIORARI IN INDIANA
For the first time the Indiana Supreme Court in Warren v.
Indiana Telephone Co.1 reviewed by a proceeding similar to common
law certiorari2 the determination of an administrative tribunal. By
ordering the entire record to be brought before it so that the questions
presented to and passed upon by the Appellate Court might more clearly
appear,3 the Supreme Court exceeded its statutory authority4 and one
of its rules.5 Until this decision the settled rule had been that
in a transfer the Supreme Court examined only the written opinions
of the Appellate Court, making no inquiry into the record upon the
theory that the purpose of the transfer act was to enable the Supreme
Court to control the declarations of legal principles expressed in the
Appellate Court's opinions and that it did not afford a means for
reviewing cases on their merits.6 Implicit in the Supreme Court's posi-
tion is the power to superintend and control inferior courts and ad-
ministrative boards. Therefore, it is timely to inquire into the office
and function of certiorari-as a non-statutory power.
Until the Warren case the sole direct authority as to certiorari
in Indiana was Indianapolis v. L. C. Thompson Mfg. Co.7 With re-
luctance the Appellate Court decided that common law certiorari was
not available for the reason that it was not authorized by the code
of 1852; therefore, a statute making final the decision of an in-
ferior court precluded review by certiorari. Contrary to this result
is the general rule prevailing elsewhere, that such a statute restrict-
ing appeal does not bar review by certiorari.8 The Court failed to
recognize that it is the very nature of certiorari to furnish a review
in those situations where there has been a miscarriage of justice in
the inferior tribunal. Directly opposed to the dogma of the Thompson
case is the early case of Commissioners v. Browun9 where the Supreme
Court in the absence of a statutory remedy issued a rule to show
126 N. E. (2d) 399 (Ind. 1940).
2 Although the court granted a writ of error, it had all the character-
istics of a common law writ of certiorari.
3 This was also done by the Court in the subsequent case of Long v.
Van Osdale, 29 N. E. (2d) 953 (Ind. 1940) citing the Warren case
as authority.
4 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §4-215.
5 Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court 1940, 2-23.
6 Barnett v. Bryce Furnace Co., 157 Ind. 572, 62 N. E. 6 (1901);
Huntington v. Lusch, 163 Ind. 266, 71 N. E. 647 (1904); Julian v.
Bliss, 196 Ind. 68, 147 N. E. 148 (1924). By issuing an order "Per
Curiam-Judgment Affirmed" the Appellate Court can no longer
exclude the Supreme Court from final jurisdiction. Hunter v.
Clev., C. & St. L. Ry., 202 Ind. 328, 174 N. E. 287 (1930).
7 40 Ind. App. 535, 81 N. E. 1159 (1907).
s State v. Graham, 60 Wis. 395, 19 N. W. 359 (1884) ; Allen v. Comm.,
57 Miss. 163 (1879); State ex rel McCallum v. Cowlitz County,
72 Wash. 144, 129 Pae. 900 (1913).
014 Ind. 191 (1860).
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cause why a judgement below should not be revoked, admittedly to
serve the purpose of a common law writ of error coram nobis. The
Court proceeded on the assumption that common law remedies were
available in extraordinary situations, under different names. In con-
trast with the language in the Thompson case that only code remedies
are available is the statement of the Supreme Court that an equitable
writ of assistance may be granted in the absence of an adequate code
substitute.10 The Thompson case denying the availability of common
law certiorari is unsound and the result reached in the Warren case
is to be preferred.
Although there is no Supreme Court case prior to the Warren
case directly in point, there has been comment about certiorari by
that Court. Newman v. Gates" has been discussed as authority that
certiorari obtains in Indiana; 12 but doubt exists as to the correctness
of that interpretation. In Curless v. Watson the majority and con-
curring opinions speak of certiorari as inherent in the Supreme Court,
existing independently of any legislative grant.13 That was a proper
conclusion since the rationale of the Warren case is that common law
certiorari exists as an inherent attribute of the judicial power granted
to the courts by the Indiana Constitution.
At common law the Court of King's Bench, as a superior court,
had the inherent power to superintend inferior tribunals and this con-
trol was effectuated by means of the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.' 4 A number of state constitutions grant
to the court of final appellate jurisdiction a general superintendency
over inferior tribunals.' 5 Elsewhere there are similar statutory pro-
visions,' 6 but caveat whether such statutes are merely declaratory of
the common law. In the absence of an express constitutional or
statutory provision, it has been held in some states that the writ
of certiorari is inherent in a supreme court. 17 Although expressly
abolished in Nebraska, certiorari, in effect, is available under the code,18
In Indiana there is no constitutional or statutory provision expressly
authorizing the Supreme Court to issue writs of certiorari.
Nevertheless, from a consideration of the Indiana territorial
laws and early statutes it is evident that there was an intention to
10 Emerick v. Miller, 159 Ind. 317, 64 N. E. 28 (1902).
11150 Ind. 59, 49 N. E. 826 (1898).
12 Curless v. Watson, 180 Ind. 86, 105, 102 N. E. 497, 504 (1913) (con-
curring opinion).
13 Curless v. Watson, 180 Ind. 86, 99, 104, 102 N. E. 497, 503, 504 (1913).
143 BL. COMM. *111; BACON ABRIDGEMENT (Bouvier 1876) Courts,
Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition.
15MONT. CONST. Art. VIII §2, COLO. CONST. Art. VI §2, N. DAK. CoNsT.
Art. IV, §86, OKLA. CONST. Art. VII, §2, wis. CONST. Art. VII, §3).
Similar provisions are found in eleven other state constitutions.
16 MASS. LAWS ANN. (Michie, 1933) c. 211, §3, Public Laws of N. Hamp.
(1926) tit. 31, c. 315, §2.
17 Territory v. Valdez, 1 N. M. 533 (1872); Tenn. C. Ry. v. Campbell,
109 Tenn. 640, 75 S. W. 1012 (1903).
18 Engels v. Morgenstern, 85 Neb. 51, 122 N. W. 688 (1909); Mathews
v. Hedlund, 82 Neb. 825, 119 N. W. 17 (1908); Moline, Milburn
and Stoddard Co. v. Curtis, 38 Neb. 520, 57 N. W. 161 (1893).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
preserve review by common law certiorari. In the Indiana territory
the General Court, as the supreme court, had power to issue "Writs
of habeas corpus, certiorari, error and all remedial and other writs." 19
Circuit courts were also vested with full power and authority to issue
writs of mandamus, dower, certiorari, partition, view, quo warranto,
habaes corups, error coram nobis, replevin and ne exeat.20 In the
Constitution of 1816 it is stated that all territorial laws not inconsistent
therewith shall continue in full force.21 At the first session of the
General Assembly the Supreme and Circuit courts were invested with
the same power and authority which the General and Circuit courts
possessed and exercised under the territorial government.22 At the
same session the Supreme Court was authorized to issue "all kinds of
writs, orders and process according to the course of the common law
and the usages of courts,"23 and circuit courts likewise were em-
powered to issue "writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, and process
necessary to carry these said powers into effect according to the course
of the common law and the usages of courts" 24 By the Revised Laws
or Statutes of 1824, 1831, 1838 and 1843 the Supreme Court was
authorized to issue "all writs and process.125  However, in the Re-
vised Statutes of 1852 it was provided that the Supreme Court shall
issue "all process"26-a conspicious omission of "writs." Apparently,
zealous legislators over-looked the fundamental distinction between
the ordinary and the extra-ordinary common law actions. On the
other hand, the New York Code of 1849 maintained this distinction
by recognizing two kinds of remedies, namely, "actions" and "special
proceedings."27
Furthermore, during the 1850 constitutional debates concerning
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, a statement was made
which applied to all extraordinary remedies. Mr. Biddie said:
"I would simply ask the gentleman whether the granting a writ
of mandamus is original jurisdiction? It may possibly be so, but
it is inherent in the Supreme Court to compel obedience to its man-
dates by mandamus, or other process, and you need not specifically
grant them this power. The power to fine is an original jurisdiction,
but it belongs inherently to all courts. The Circuit Courts are suf-
ficient for all cases where the writ of mandamus may become nec-
essary."28
19 Laws of the Indiana Territory Rev. Stat. (1807) c. 3, §1, reproduced
in Illinois Historical Collections, vol. xxi (1930), Indiana Historical
Collections Reprint (1931) 230.
20 Ind. Acts. 1814 c. 2, §3.
2 1 IND. CONST. Art. XII, §4.
2 2 IND. LAWS (1816-17) c. 3, §1, 2.
2 3 IND. LAWS (1816-17) c. 1, §7.
2 4IND. LAWS (1816-17) c. 2, §5.
25 IND. REV. LAWS (1824) c. 25, §9; (1831) c. 24, §9; (1838) c. 25, §15;
(1843) c. 37, §1.2 6 IND. REV. STAT. (1852), c. 1, §5.
27 New York Laws 1849, c. 438, §1. Common law certiorari is a special
proceeding within the meaning of the code. People v. Fuller, 40
How. Prac. 35 (N. Y. 1870).
21 Debates in Indiana Convention (1850), 1684, Indiana Historical Col-
lections Reprints.
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It is submitted that Indiana statutes defining the powers of the courts
are merely declatory of the common law. Because certiorari is such
a valuable writ, the general rule is that it can be taken away or
restricted only by some clear legislative enactment or express language
to that effect.20 Therefore, as a statutory matter the result reached
by the Supreme Court in the Warren case is justifiable.
The Supreme Court has taken conflicting positions as respects its
inherent power to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition in aid of
its constitutional jurisdiction. In 1821, by virtue of the judicial power,
the Court had no difficulty in mandating a circuit court to make an
order conforming to a judgment which had been reversed.30 More than
a hundred years later the Court in a very strong dictum stated that
it had the power implied under the constitution to issue writs nec-
essary to exercise completely and properly its jurisdiction in appeals.3 1
In the absence of any statute the Supreme Court now can mandate
the Appellate Court. 2 During the intervening years, however, the
Supreme Court steadfastly maintained the contrary position, namely,
that the authority to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction was purely statutory.83 In view of the
Warren case the net result is that the Supreme Court possesses, under
the constitution, a general superintending power.3 4
Certiorari is the proper remedy to review the "judicial" or
"4quasi-judicial" conduct of inferior boards and officers, not that which
'29New Jersey R. R. and Tr. Co. v. Suydam, 17 N. J. L. 25 (1839);
Ritter v. Kunkle, 39 N. J. L. 259 (1877); Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa.
403 (1862).80 Jared v. Hill, I Blackf. 155 (Ind. 1821).
31 State ex rel Hannahan v. Chambers, 203 Ind. 523, 525, 181 N. E.
282, 282 (1932).
32 Warren v. Ind. Tel. Co., 26 N. E. (2d) 399 (Ind. 1940) ; State ex rel
Daily v. Kime, 213 Ind. 1, 11 N. E. (2d) 140 (1937) (by implica-
tion); see State ex rel Sluss v. Appellate Court, 214 Ind. 686, 692,
17 N. E. (2d) 824, 827 (1938).
38 Comm. v. Spitler, 13 Ind. 235 (1859); State ex rel Reynolds v.
Comm., 45 Ind. 501 (1874); State ex rel Green v. Jeffries, 83 Ind.
App. 524, 149 N. E. 373 (1925).
3 Courts have inherent power to protect their dignity and punish
contempts. Little v, State, 90 Ind. 338 (1883). On its own motion
the Supreme Court may recall a former written opinion and
substitute another in its place, even after term time. McBride
v. Coleman, 189 Ind. 7, 125 N. E. 449 (1919). A rule-making power
inheres in the Supreme Court, Smith v. State, 137 Ind. 198, 36 N.
E. 108 (1894), and court rules can not be abolished by the Gen-
eral Assembly. Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 127 N. E. 411 (1920).
Pursuant to legislative authorization, the Supreme Court can
abrogate and declare ineffective practice acts. Rules of the Ind.
Sup. Court, 1940. Statutes defining judicial power are only
declaratory and statutes impinging or restricting judicial power
are unconstitutional. Young v. State Bank, 4 d. 301 (1853);
State ex rel Hovey v. Nobel, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 244 (1889);
Guckien v. Rothrock, 137 Ind. 355, 37 N. E. 17 (1894). However,
in failing to keep separate the concepts of judicial power andjurisdiction the Indiana Supreme Court in the Warren case
reached a result contrary to that of the United States Supreme
Court. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. 506 (1869).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
is discretionary. The question of what is a "judicial" or "quasi-judicial"
act in Indiana has arisen as a separation of powers problem, and
decisions of the Supreme Court on this issue will prove inadequate for
determining if an act is of such a nature as to be reviewable by cer-
tiorari. The rule was early enunciated that "a judicial act must be
performed by a court. '35 On the other hand, a duty which involves
the exercise of discretion is generally characterized as "quasi-judicial."36
In order for Indiana courts to give full effect to review by cer-
tiorari, it will be necessary for them to adopt a less technical defini-
tion of "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" acts than the one formulated
for the purpose of sustaining the constitutionality of statutes under
a separation of powers problem. Courts must recognize that it is the
nature of administrative boards and officers to exercise both a
judicial power and a discretion and that it is the purpose of certiorari,
in general, to review the former, not to disturb the latter. In cer-
torari proceedings the the rule is for courts to look more at the char-
acter of the act performed and less at the nature of the body which
performed it.
By statutory certiorari the illegality of decisions of municipal
boards of zoning appeals is reviewed by circuit or superior courts.87
Since it is restricted to making variances from district regulations, a
board's decision re-zoning an entire city block is illegal,38 but an "ir-
regularity of procedure" is not.3 9 Illegality includes a violation of a
constitutional right.40 By means of certiorari a circuit court may not
review a board's discretion, but only an abuse thereof.4" Under the
guise of hearing supplementary evidence, the court will not be per-
mitted to conduct a trial de novo.42
The Warren case states that upon reviewing an administrative
order it is the duty of the court to determine the question of jurisdic-
tion and to insure that the requirements of due process have been met.
Other statements indicate that the nature and scope of certiorari in
Indiana will be the same as generally obtain elsewhere either by stat-
ute or practice. Although it is usually announced that the reviewing
sr Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 173 (1861). Accord: Jay v.
O'Donnell, 178 Ind. 282, 98 N. E. 349 (1912); State ex rel. Hord
v. Comm., 101 Ind. 69 (1884); Forrey v. Comm., 189 Ind. 257,
126 N. E. 673 (1919).
36 State ex rel. Burroughs v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750(1898); State ex rel. French v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 463, 5 N. E. 553
1885); Compare Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N. E. 792 (1907)
with Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N. E, 197 (1885),
37 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §48-2305.
30 Indianapolis v. Ostrom, 95 Ind. App. 376, 176 N. E. 246 (1932).
3o Board of Zoning Appeals v. Moyer, 27 N. E. (2d) 905 (Ind. App.
1940).
40 South Bend v. Marckle, 215 Ind. 74, 18 N. E. (2d) 764 (1938).
41 Board of Zoning Appeals v. Waintrup, 99 Ind. App. 576, 193 N. E.
701 (1935).
42 O'Connor v. Overall Laundy, 98 Ind. App. 28, 183 N. E. 134 (1933).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
court will not pass upon the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, 43
nevertheless, it is equally true that in the absence of any evidence to
support it, the decision or order will be set aside.44 The rule is
phrased thus: if there had been an ordinary trial, would it have
been error to have submitted the question to the jury? The Court
is also in agreement with the authorities when it states that a
reviewing court will not weigh conflicting evidence45 nor determine
the credibility of witnesses. 48 On the other hand, however, in con-
cluding that it will review an abuse of discretion, the Court enunciated
the minority rule.47 Nevertheless, the point has been well taken that
the review of an abuse of judicial discretion is desirable if otherwise
there would be no remedy.48
Finally, it is well to point out the possible effects of the Warren
case upon judicial review in Indiana. Certiorari lies to review judg-
ments of lower courts made final by statute. Thus, the judg-
ments of circuit courts in statutory proceedings should be reviewable.
In such cases, however, shall the petition be addressed to the Appellate
Court or to the Supreme Court? Here is presented a procedure which
the Supreme Court or the legislature must prescribe. As the Appellate
Court is also a superior court, upon principle it has the authority to
issue writs of certiorari. Or perhaps certiorari will issue only from
those courts created by the constitution. However that may be, the
same policy which provides that appeals in cases of mandate, prohibi-
tion, quo warranto, and habeas corpus shall be taken directly to the
Supreme Court clearly is applicable to certiorari.4 9 Also, a judgment
of the Appellate Court in a certiorari proceeding can be transferred to
the Supreme Court. Conceivably, circuit courts might issue writs of
certiorari to review proceedings of county commissioners and cases in
justices of the peace courts. "Judicial" or "quasi-judicial" acts of
county and municipal officers and boards may also be reviewed by
the circuit courts. From these judgments appeals could then be taken
to the higher courts.
R. J. P.
43 New River Coal Co. v. Flies, 215 Ala. 64, 109 So. 360 (1926); Over-
street v. Ill. Power and Light Co., 356 Ill. 378, 190 N. E. 676
(1934); Carroll v. City Comm. of Grand Rapids, 266 Mich. 123,
253 N. W. 240 (1934).
44 People ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39 N. Y. 506 (1868); Appeal
of Walker, 294 Pa. 385, 144 Atl. 288 (1928); Hanna v. Board of
Alderman, 54 R. I. 392, 173 Atl. 358 (1934).
45 See note 43, supra.
46 Independence v. Pompton, 9 N. J. L. 209 (1827); People v.
Swanson, 217 Mich. 103, 185 N. W. 844 (1921); Crocher v. Abel,
348 Ill. 269, 180 N. E. 852 (1932).
47 In re Hanson, 2 Cal. 262 (1852) ; Appeal of Vaux, 109 Pa. St. Rep.
497 (1885). Contra: Commonwealth v. Roxbury. 8 Mass. 457
(1812); Tiedt v. Carstensen, 61 Iowa 334, 16 N. W. 214 (1883).
48Note (1932-33) 18 IOWA L. Rv. 263.
49IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §4-214.
